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Abstract
This study examines China’s role in the Angolan Civil War through the context of U.S.-Chinese
rapprochement and the global Cold War. Based on declassified conversations between U.S. and
Chinese officials along with declassified intelligence cables, government documents, and
research in the United Nations archives this paper illuminates how China played a crucial role in
escalating the Angolan Civil War and encouraged U.S. intervention in the conflict. This study
builds on previous scholarship yet takes a new approach that emphasizes China played the
primary role in intensifying the Angolan Civil War, not the U.S. or Soviet Union.
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Introduction
Angola, China, and the United States.
At first glance interaction between these three very different nations may seem unclear to
the global study of the Cold War. However, during the mid-1970s these three became interlinked
in the Angolan Civil War. Angola’s Civil War, along with U.S. and Chinese involvement in the
conflict, constitutes a major subject in the Cold War. Throughout the 1970s American foreign
policy rested on two strategies: détente and triangular diplomacy. Détente, or the relaxation of
tensions between the Soviet Union and the U.S., encompassed roughly 1969-1976. Triangular
diplomacy was the strategy of exploiting the rivalry between the two largest communist powers,
China and the Soviet Union, to the advantage of the United States. The Angolan Civil War
forever changed both détente and triangular diplomacy. The crisis pitted Angola’s three
liberation movements against each other based on delineations that conflicted traditional Cold
War battle lines. The communist MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola)
received aid from the Soviet Union and Cuba, while its rivals the FNLA (National Front for the
Liberation of Angola) and UNITA (Union for the Total Independence of Angola) were supported
by the U.S., China, South Africa, and Zaire. Though the MPLA emerged the victor the Angolan
Civil War was the first instance of U.S.-Chinese cooperation in a Third World conflict where
both sides stood together, albeit shortly, against the Soviet Union. This makes the Angolan crisis
a highly important, though often neglected, subject in Cold War history.
During and after the Angolan crisis conservative American politicians and Chinese
diplomats relentlessly criticized détente as appeasing Soviet aggression in the Third World.
Furthermore, China manipulated U.S. fears of Soviet expansion in the Third World to their
advantage and encouraged the U.S. to pursue a more interventionist policy in Angola, effectively

!

1!

reversing triangular diplomacy. Yet, after the U.S. and its ally apartheid South Africa became
heavily involved in the Angolan Civil War, China withdrew its aid to the FNLA and UNITA in
October of 1975. In lieu of continuing to aid the American and South African backed anti-Soviet
FNLA/UNITA coalition, the PRC (People’s Republic of China) choose to focus on domestic
issues such as leadership succession amid the political turmoil of the waning Cultural Revolution
and the possibility of a Soviet invasion. Due to these more pressing domestic issues China did
not combat the Soviets in Angola, instead urging the U.S. to do so and despite America’s best
efforts China refused to reinvest itself in the Angolan conflict after October of 1975. Moreover,
American intervention in Angola proved unpopular domestically and the Senate ended up
passing legislation that blocked further U.S. action in Angola. In the midst of dismantling détente
and reversing triangular diplomacy Angola became an international battleground as the U.S.,
South Africa, China, North Korea, Zaire, Romania, Soviet Union, Cuba, German Democratic
Republic, France, and Yugoslavia all gave aid to one of the liberation groups at some point.
Despite China’s role in escalating the conflict historians have primarily focused on the
U.S., Soviet, Cuban, and South African roles largely because they were most heavily involved in
the fighting. In the first authoritative account of the Angolan Civil War John Marcum
investigated the historical origins of Angolan nationalism and its three liberation movements. He
argued that external factors such as the Cold War and foreign military aid exacerbated
underlying ethnic and ideological differences between Angola’s liberation movements and
escalated the situation into a full-blown civil war.1 Though The Angolan Revolution Vol. I and
Vol. II are extremely informative and in depth they were published in the 1969 and 1978,
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See John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution Volume 1: The Anatomy of an Explosion 1950-1962 (Cambridge:
M.I.T. Press, 1969) and John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution Volume II: Exile Politics and Guerilla Warfare
1962-1976 (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1978).
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respectively. Therefore Marcum could not make use of newly declassified material on the
subject.
More recently, historians have paid close attention to international involvement in the
Angolan Civil War and its larger impact on the Cold War. Piero Gleijeses’ Conflicting Missions,
for example, focuses heavily on Cuba’s role in Africa and its support of liberation movements
fighting for independence from minority white governments and colonial powers. Drawing on a
wealth of declassified material from U.S., Cuban, and Eastern European archives Gleijeses
shatters the Cold War myth that Cuba acted as a Soviet puppet. Moscow, says Gleijeses, feared
that Cuba’s adventurist foreign policy would strain détente with the United States.2 Odd Arne
Westad’s Global Cold War similarly emphasizes the global implications of the Angolan Civil
War, but focuses instead on how the crisis led to the decline of détente internationally and its
condemnation in the American political arena. Through research in Soviet archives Westad also
highlights the confidence boost Angola gave to the Soviets, having defeated the U.S. in Vietnam
and Angola consecutively.3
Although highly significant to the global study of the Cold War Marcum, Westad, and
Gleijeses largely ignore an enormous factor: China. Historically, China has been more involved
in Africa than the Soviets and in the 1970s half of China’s economic aid went to Africa.4 The
PRC was the first foreign power to aid any of the Angolan liberation movements and had ties
with all three dating back to the late 1950s and early 1960s. China even admitted delegates from
the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA to Beijing for military and political training. They were also the
first foreign power to deliver significant amounts of military aid and advisors to an Angolan
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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See Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 2002).
3
See Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
4
Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, 238.
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liberation movement in 1973,5 raising the stakes of the Angolan conflict. Furthermore, the
Soviets initially acted in Angola to counter the growing influence of the Chinese, not the United
States.
The lack of attention to China’s role in the Angolan Civil War is understandable. Due to
China’s slow and reluctant declassification process few government documents concerning
Chinese policy during the Angolan crisis have been made available to the public.6 As a result
secondary literature on the subject is limited. This raises several important questions about
China’s role in the Angolan crisis and the effect of China’s Angolan policy on détente and
triangular diplomacy. Why did Chinese diplomats condemn détente during and after the Angolan
crisis? Why was China the first foreign power to intervene in Angola but also the first to leave?
How did the Angolan crisis impact U.S.-Chinese relations and triangular diplomacy? And
finally, why did China publicly condemn U.S. intervention in Angola but encourage it privately?
This thesis seeks to address these questions and will illuminate a previously unexplored
topic in the Cold War: U.S.-Chinese collusion during the Angolan Civil War and its effects on
détente and triangular diplomacy. Based on a wealth of recently declassified U.S. State
Department and CIA documents, as well as archival material from the United Nations, Cold War
International History Project (CWIHP), and Digital National Security Archive (DNSA) I will
argue that the Chinese pressured the U.S. to intervene in Angola but refused to reciprocate
America’s efforts and subsequently ceased their aid to anti-Soviet forces in Angola despite the
pleas of U.S. President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. For Chinese leaders
Angola emerged as a battleground to combat growing Soviet influence in Africa, but insisted the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story (New York: Norton & Company, 1978), 257.
For an excellent synopsis of Chinese archives and declassifications see Yafeng Xia’s article “The Study of Cold
War International History in China: A Review of the Last Twenty Years,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 10,
No. 1 (Winter 2008): 81-115.
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U.S. alone should halt the Soviet’s expansion in the region. However, the Ford administration
eventually received significant domestic backlash regarding U.S. involvement in Angola.
Though China acted first in Angola and deplored Soviet expansionism in the Third World it did
not want to risk its reputation by associating with the U.S. or apartheid South Africa.
Furthermore, China had more pressing domestic concerns, namely the succession of top
leadership in the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) and a possible Soviet invasion stemming from
the Sino-Soviet split and border conflict.
To properly examine the subject a background of Portugal’s colonialism in Angola and
the formation of nationalist liberation movements seeking independence is needed. After
understanding how and why the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA were founded the role of foreign
sympathizers, détente, triangular diplomacy, and U.S.-Chinese collusion in escalating the
conflict can be properly explored. Once the Angolan crisis and foreign intervention is
investigated the reasons why American and Chinese policy began to diverge in the 1980s and
how China became a prominent investor in Africa while the U.S. continued to pursue highly
unpopular policies in the region will emerge.
Portuguese Colonialism, African Resistance, and Angola’s Independence
When the Portuguese arrived in Angola during the 15th century they encountered three
distinct ethnic groups: the Kongo kingdom, who resided near the coast in northern Angolan, the
Mbundu who lived south of the Kongo kingdom, and the Ovimbundu who occupied Angola’s
central highlands region. Each ethnic group had its own unique culture and though there were
other smaller kingdoms and ethnic groups, these three would eventually form the basis of
support for each of Angola’s liberation movements. The Portuguese and Kongo kingdom traded
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various commodities but most importantly, slaves.7 The slave trade between Portugal and the
Kongo kingdom started slow but exploded when sugar plantations sprouted in the Portuguese
colonies of Sao Tome and Brazil.8 In total Angola lost 8 million people to slavery, “a heavier
loss than any other country in Africa has borne.”9 The loss of able-bodied men and women began
to devastate the economy and authority of the Kongo kingdom as those who grew rich off the
slave trade began to challenge the traditional power structure of the kingdom. The decline of the
Kongo kingdom enabled the Portuguese to establish the city of Luanda on the coast and claim
Angola as a colony in 1576.
By the early 20th Century, Angola remained under firm Portuguese control. In 1926 a
military coup installed Antonio Salazar as the unquestioned ruler of Portugal. During Salazar’s
dictatorship “Portugal’s overseas territories assumed increased importance.”10 The Benguela
Railway was completed, linking mines in the Belgian Congo to the Angolan port city of Lobito.
Furthermore, there was “rapid development in a wide variety of agricultural, fishing, mining, and
manufacturing industries, and from the late 1950s on, in oil production as well.”11 Angola also
proved to have large reserves of diamonds; money from these so-called blood diamonds would
help fund Angola’s Civil War for almost thirty years. New economic opportunity led to an
unprecedented influx of Portuguese settlers, “from 80,000 to approximately 200,000 between
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Slavery existed in the Kongo kingdom prior to the arrival of the Portuguese, but it was a very different form of
slavery. Slaves in the Kongo were prisoners of war or refugees, not captured by slave traders and they were kept
within the area, not exported overseas.
8
Inge Tvedten, Angola: Struggle for Peace and Reconstruction (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 18.!
9
Ibid, 18.
10
Marcum, The Angolan Revolution Vol. 1, 5.
11
Gretchen Bauer and Scott D. Taylor, Politics in Southern Africa: State and Society in Transition (Boulder: Lynn
Rienner Publishers, 2005), 144.
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1950 and 1961.”12 Yet high rates of economic growth and investment did little for the Angolan
people and in 1950 ninety-five percent of Angolans over the age of 15 were illiterate.13
As more Portuguese settlers moved to Angola, a “systemic policy of segregation was
carried out through division of the population into indigenas (indigenous peoples), and
assimilados (assimilated nonwhites), and Europeans.”14 Indigenas were forced to carry
identification cards, work six months a year for the colonial government, and possessed no
political or social rights. Assimilados had to meet certain educational, economic, and linguistic
requirements and also committed to abandon their traditional way of life. The division of
Angola’s population into assimilados and indigenas also coincided with the strengthening of
African ethnic identities. The Kongo people “developed a special identity based on its former
importance as a kingdom” and “developed close links with Zaire and with West African culture.”
The Mbundu were identified by their “close interaction with the Portuguese and their subsequent
‘Westernization’ and, later, urbanization” as well as their “affiliation” with mesticos.15 While the
Ovimbundu’s “ethnic solidarity” was “developed through their relative isolation in the central
highlands region and their economic superiority through involvement in trade and agropastoral
production.”16 These three different ethnic identities formed the foundation for each of Angola’s
three nationalist liberation movements that sought independence from Portugal.
Still, the formation of nationalist liberation groups came to Angola much later than other
African colonies. This was due to widespread population displacement at the hands of the
Portuguese, first through slavery and later forced migration and labor. There was also a wide gap
between the educated assimilados, who resided in cities near the coast, and the indigenas, who
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Tvedten, Angola, 26.
Marcum, Angola Revolution Vol. 1, 28.
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Tvedten, Angola, 27.!
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Mestico is a term used to refer to those of mixed race, in this case African/European.
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Tvedten, Angola, 28.
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lived mostly in the rural countryside and townships. The geographic, social, and ethnic
differences between the two groups made cooperation and resistance against the Portuguese
difficult. Additionally, “Censorship, border control, police action, and control of education all
postponed the development of African leadership.”17 Yet despite the best efforts of the
Portuguese authorities Angolans began to form nationalist liberation movements based on ethnic
identities in the 1950s and 1960s.
In 1956 Agostinho Neto, a doctor and poet who studied medicine in Portugal, formed the
first Angolan liberation movement, the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola). The MPLA espoused a Marxist political doctrine and garnered most of their support
from the Mbundu ethnic group, mesticos, and whites. The MPLA was also “the most popular
movement in the main towns” such as Luanda and was “well supported by intellectuals.”18 The
leadership of the MPLA was generally well educated compared to its rivals, giving it a political
and administrative edge over its competitors. Initially, the colonial Portuguese government
cracked down hard on Neto and the MPLA and many of its leaders were exiled or languished in
Portuguese prisons. Though plagued by internal factionalism the MPLA received aid from
China, but the Soviets and Cubans emerged as much more generous donors.
The next liberation movement to be created was the FNLA (National Front for the
Liberation of Angola) in 1962. Holden Roberto, the group’s leader, attended a Baptist missionary
school in northern Angola where he “came under the influence of Kongo nationalists.”19 The
FNLA adhered to an exclusively African notion of Angolan nationalism that conflicted with the
more urban based and multiracial MPLA. Roberto drew support from the Kongo ethnic group in
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Ibid, 29.
Note for the Secretary-General, 8 November 1974, Box: S-0902-0010-02-00001, Folder: Peacekeeping-Africa
1963-1981, United Nations Archives (UNA), New York City. !
19
Tvedten, Angola, 30.
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the northern countryside and due to early military aid from Zaire and China the FNLA became
“stronger than any of the other liberation movements.” However, the Kongo people straddled the
border between Angola and Zaire giving the FNLA “little political support within Angola.”20
The FNLA’s support from Zaire was further strengthened by the fact that Zaire’s President,
Mobutu Sese Seko, was Roberto’s brother in law. During the Angolan Civil War Roberto,
fearing assassination, rarely entered Angola preferring to remain in the safety of Zaire. In
addition to Zaire and China the FNLA would also receive support from the U.S.
Jonas Savimbi created Angola’s last liberation movement, UNITA (National Union for
the Total Independence of Angola) in 1964. Savimbi studied medicine in Portugal, politics in
Switzerland, and was originally a member of the FNLA. However, Savimbi, a member of the
Ovimbundu ethnic group, defected from the FNLA because “he was critical of the strong Kongo
dominance in that movement.”21 UNITA drew support from the Ovimbundu though its political
ideology continually shifted to suit whomever it received external aid from. Militarily, UNITA
was the weakest of the three liberation movements, but managed to conduct an insurgency
against the independent Angolan government for almost thirty years. Savimbi also colluded with
notorious characters such as the colonial Portuguese military and apartheid South Africa in his
effort to rule Angola. Eventually the U.S., China, and South Africa would aid UNITA.
Violent resistance to the Portuguese colonial apparatus began in January and February of
1961 with a “violent boycott against the forced cultivation of cotton” as Angolan indigenas
“abandoned their fields, burnt their identification cards, and attacked Portuguese traders.”22
Angolan indigenas also attempted to free political prisoners from the jails of Luanda. This initial
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Note for the Secretary-General, 8 November 1974, S-0902-0010-02-00001, Peacekeeping-Africa 1963-1981,
UNA.
21
Tvedten, Angola, 30.!
22
Ibid, 31.
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revolt of the early 1960s was met by fierce opposition from the Portuguese, who used forced
migrations to create controlled villages where the general population could be cut off from the
liberation movements. As a result, the MPLA established an exile base in Congo, the FNLA did
the same in Zaire, while UNITA mostly stayed in Angola’s southeastern countryside. From exile
bases in neighboring countries along with small outposts in the rural Angolan countryside the
MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA fought a guerilla war against the Portuguese military. Moreover, due
to ideological differences regarding Angolan nationalism the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA fought
each other as well, inhibiting their effectiveness against the Portuguese.
Yet Angola was not Portugal’s only colony to violently demand independence during the
1960s. In Mozambique and Guinea, Africans formed more effective nationalist liberation groups
that were conducting fierce wars of independence against their colonial oppressors, often with
foreign aid and support. However, Portugal was determined to maintain control of its colonies,
especially Angola due to its natural wealth. But subduing the nationalist aspirations of its African
colonies began to take its toll on Portugal and by the early 1970s colonial wars “consumed 40
percent of the government’s budget and more than 5 percent of the country’s GDP.”23 Portugal’s
fierce crackdown on African nationalists also began to damage its reputation, both at home and
abroad. In Portugal, citizens were leery of military conscription to fight in colonies where
casualty rates among junior officers were notoriously high. Even Portugal’s NATO allies
criticized its policies, and the U.S. began endorsing United Nations resolutions that condemned
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Portuguese colonialism in Africa.24 Moreover, the U.S. lamented that Portugal was using U.S.
supplied military equipment to suppress African nationalism in its colonies.25
Portugal’s budget woes and unpopular colonial policies came to a head in the 1974
Carnation Revolution. In April 1974, the Armed Forces Movement, which consisted of lower
ranking military officers, overthrew Salazar in a bloodless coup and named General Antonio de
Spinola president. After the Carnation Revolution Portugal began to reform its colonial policies
and granted independence to Guinea in September 1974 and Mozambique in June 1975. Angola,
however, was different, “It was the richest of the Portuguese colonies” and also had “the largest
white population and the weakest insurgency.”26 The MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA fought each
other as much as the Portuguese and never controlled much of Angola, only small patches of
land in the countryside. Moreover, most people lived in the cities and towns near the coast so
neither movement ever gained much of a consensus among the general population. This made it
unclear exactly whom Portugal should hand over power to.
To quell the fighting and bring a democratic end to the situation the MPLA, FNLA,
UNITA, and Portugal signed the Alvor Agreement on 15 January 1975. The Alvor Agreement
recognized the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA “as the sole legitimate representatives of the people
of Angola.”27 It also set Angola’s independence for 15 November 1975 and set up a transitional
government to oversee Angola’s shift from colony to sovereign country. A Portuguese general
was named High Commissioner of the transitional government and representatives from the
MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA compromised the Presidential Council. Delegates from Angola’s
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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The U.S. voted for the Soviet sponsored Resolution 1654, “The Situation With Regard to the Implementation of
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31 August 1961, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1961-1963, Vol. 21, Document 353.
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liberation movements were also appointed to various positions such as Minister of Interior and
Minister of Justice. These positions were distributed equally among the MPLA, FNLA, and
UNITA and no group held a majority of power in the transitional government.28 The Alvor
Agreement also scheduled Angola’s first elections for 31 October 1975 when Angolans would
elect a “Constituent Assembly, which would select the country’s first president.”29
However, the peace established by the agreement was short lived and before long the
MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA, flush with foreign military aid, resumed their war for control of
Angola’s looming independence. Fighting began in Luanda where each movement had
established a presence after the Carnation Revolution. In late January and early February the
Soviet armed MPLA and Chinese armed FNLA engaged in sporadic clashes, making the initial
battles of 1975 a proxy war between Moscow and Beijing. UNITA was not active in this early
round of fighting largely because its presence in Luanda was so small. Furthermore, Savimbi was
in the Angolan countryside rallying support and “strengthening UNITA’s ties with the FNLA”
forming a coalition to stand against the MPLA.30 By March an all out war was being fought in
the slums of Luanda between the MPLA and FNLA. Portugal set up numerous ceasefires, but did
not enforce them militarily. As a result, no truce lasted more than a month as the fighting spread
throughout Angola and by July, “the MPLA expelled the FNLA from Luanda.”31 With the crisis
in Angola intensifying Portuguese citizens, who compromised most of the skilled labor in
Angola, began to flee the country depriving Angola of vital human capital. While it is not exactly
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For a full list of positions in the transitional government see, Permanent Mission of Portugal to the United Nations
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clear who fired the first shots in 1975, it is clear who was providing the ammunition: foreign
military donors whose aid fundamentally undermined the principles of the Alvor Agreement.
With war raging in Angola the United Nations and Organization of African Unity (OAU)
attempted to succeed where the Portuguese failed and establish a meaningful ceasefire between
Angola’s conflicting liberation movements. These efforts culminated in October 1975 when the
OAU Conciliation Commission on Angola met with representatives of the MPLA, FNLA,
UNITA, and Portugal in Uganda. During the meeting the OAU “appealed to the three liberation
movements… to bury their petty and ideological differences for the sake of the greater interest of
Angola.” The Conciliation Commission also requested Portugal “assume, without delay and in
an impartial manner, its responsibilities in Angola.” Foreign interference was also denounced
and the OAU called for foreign countries to “immediately cease all interference in the internal
affairs of Angola and supplying arms to the parties concerned.”32 Though the commission made
the proper assessments and recommendations, the OAU had no way to enforce its positions.
Furthermore, the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA used the summit to merely hurl accusations at one
another while foreign powers, specifically the U.S., South Africa, Soviet Union, and Cuba,
continued to escalate the Angolan Civil War by introducing large amounts of weapons into
Angola. Yet shortly after the OAU’s meeting China, who had initially sparked an arms race in
Angola with large shipments of weapons to the FNLA in 1973, withdrew from the conflict and
encouraged the U.S. to take their place as the primary weapons supplier to the FNLA/UNITA
coalition.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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The Report of the OAU Conciliation Commission on Angola, October 1975, S-0972-0001-04, Items in
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U.S.-Chinese Diplomacy Surrounding Angola
But while Chinese diplomats pressured the U.S. into increased action in Angola China
refused to provide any further aid to the FNLA/UNITA coalition despite the requests of U.S.
leaders Gerald Ford and Henry Kissinger. On 20 October 1975, a mere seven days before China
left Angola, Chinese officials accused the United States of appeasing the Soviets in order to
advance détente. China’s Vice Premier of the State Council, Deng Xiaoping, claimed that after
the Helsinki conference, where the U.S. promised not to intervene in Eastern Europe, “the
Russians, they now feel you cannot restrain them.”33 Though Angola is not mentioned directly it
appears the Chinese are challenging the U.S. to do more to ensure a MPLA defeat. For the
Chinese, a negotiated settlement with the Soviets in Angola would amount to appeasement and
prove that the U.S. could not restrain the Soviets.
When China and the U.S. discussed Angola directly, President Ford tried to bring China
back into the conflict but to no avail. Ford even went on the defensive to prove the U.S. could
deter the Soviets by citing the amount of U.S. aid to the FNLA and UNITA. During the Beijing
summit of December 1975, Ford admitted to Mao Zedong, China’s leader from 1949-1976, his
concerns about the Soviets gaining a foothold in Angola. “You don’t seem to have any means [to
push the Soviets out of Angola]” Mao replied. Here Mao seems to be referencing the domestic
opposition the U.S. faced regarding intervention in Angola. Ford responded that both the U.S.
and China “could do better” to combat the Soviets in Angola, insinuating China could possibly
return to Angola. However, Mao refused because of the involvement of South Africa. “This has
offended the whole of black Africa,” he said. “This complicates the whole matter.”34 Mao made
an interesting point here. He grasps the racial aspect as to why black Africans resented apartheid
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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South Africa meddling in Angola’s affairs, something the U.S. was apparently not concerned
about judging by the level of U.S.-South African cooperation in the conflict.
Later in the conversation Ford continued his attempts to push Mao back into Africa. “I say
again that time is of the essence because the other two forces need encouragement… It would be
tragic if the MPLA should prevail after the efforts that have been made by us and by you and
others.” Yet Mao gave vague response: “That’s hard to say. So you think that’s about all?” Ford
made one last attempt to prove the U.S. could restrain the Soviets in Angola remarking, “just
before I left Washington I approved another $35 million to help the other two forces. This is a
solid indication to meet the challenge of the Soviet Union and defeat the MPLA.” Mao’s
response was simply “Good.”35 It is clear that despite Ford’s best efforts he could not persuade
Mao to reenter the Angolan conflict. Furthermore, by the end of the conversation Ford is on the
defensive trying to prove to Mao that he is taking the proper measures to combat the Soviets in
Angola.
Chinese and U.S. officials continued their discussion of Angola the following day. Vice
Premier Deng declared, “We have noticed that it seems recently the Soviet Union has adopted a
tougher position—a fiercer position. And I believe that Mr. Secretary made a statement with
regard to the problems in Angola.” He went on to state that the Soviets were seeking a strategic
military port in Angola. Furthermore, the Soviets were escalating their involvement due to the
upcoming Party Congress and “their belief that détente should not prevent the Soviet Union from
seeking hegemony.” Deng went as far as to call the U.S. and its allies “empty cannons” and
teased “we told the Europeans that at present the total military strength of the Soviet Union is
stronger than that of the United States and Western Europe put together.”36 Here Deng is clearly
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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still questioning the U.S.’s ability to restrain the Soviets despite Ford’s previous reassurance and
disclosure of funds to the FNLA and UNITA. Deng also questioned the overall military strength
of the U.S. and its allies, asserting that China believes the Soviets are more powerful than the
U.S. and their “empty cannons.”
Later in the conversation the idea of renewed Chinese aid to the FNLA/UNITA coalition
was brought up. However, this time the Ford and Kissinger did not beat around the bush and
directly asked the Chinese to support the FNLA and UNITA either directly or through their
mutual ally Zaire. Deng asserted, “We have a good relationship with Zaire, but what we can help
them with is only some light weapons.” Kissinger countered, “We can give them weapons. What
they need is training in guerrilla warfare. If you can give them light weapons it would help, but
the major thing is training.” Here Kissinger made a formal request that China renew their
training of the FNLA/UNITA coalition. Yet, Deng brushed the request aside, stating that China
had previously aided all three liberation movements “and the organization which we helped
earliest was MPLA.”37
Ford and Kissinger continued to press for Chinese intervention, but Deng claimed that
China could not transfer aid to the FNLA/UNITA coalition and reverted back to the issue of
South Africa. “The primary problem is the involvement of South Africa. In those countries
which originally did not support the MPLA, there is now a change in attitude exactly because of
the involvement of South Africa.” Ford responded, “We had nothing to do with the South
African involvement.”38 In fact, CIA officers were collaborating with South Africans in the field
sharing equipment and information.39 Deng also referred to the fact that after South Africa
invaded Angola many African countries who were neutral or favored the FNLA or UNITA
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began supporting the MPLA simply because they were defending Angola from the invasion of
apartheid South Africa.
After Deng explained the difficulty in funneling aid to the FNLA/UNITA coalition due to a
lack of friendly African governments Ford still urged Chinese involvement: “Will you move in
the north if we move in the south?” Northern Angola was a stronghold of the FNLA while South
Africa and UNITA launched their assault from the southern and eastern regions of Angola.
However, Deng refused to budge, “But you should give greater help in the north too,” he said.
“As far as I know, you have many ways to help. Also through third countries.” Ford agreed that
the U.S. needed to take on more responsibility in northern Angola without any real commitment
from Deng to provide any further aid. So far in the conversation the Deng has halfheartedly
agreed to “try” to deliver aid to the FNLA/UNITA coalition while convincing Ford to take even
more responsibility in the conflict.40
Despite the lack of Chinese commitment to provide any further aid or training in Angola
Kissinger and Ford insisted they were up to the task of restraining the Soviets in Africa.
Kissinger divulged that the U.S. was cooperating with France. “They will send some equipment
and training,” he insisted. Ford reiterated the $35 million he approved for the FNLA/UNITA
coalition and Deng responded by encouraging “It is worth spending more money on that
problem.”41 The conversation ended with the Ford and Kissinger accomplishing little while Deng
convinced them to commit more resources and shoulder more of the burden in Angola.
However, Kissinger reported the outcome of the December 1975 summit in Beijing much
differently in his memoirs. He states, “Mao went along with Ford’s request” to provide more
arms to the FNLA/UNITA coalition. Kissinger continued, “three months later, when I was
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shuttling around Africa, I found that Mao had, in fact, kept his promise and delivered some thirty
tanks” via Zaire.42 It appears Kissinger is distorting the facts to make his argument on the subject
look better. Neither Mao nor Deng ever agreed to send any further aid to the FNLA/UNITA
coalition; the official transcripts of the conversations prove that. Moreover, the tanks Kissinger
claims China had delivered to Zaire may have been mentioned in a June 1975 intelligence cable
stating the Chinese “gave Mobutu a substantial quantity of military equipment, including
tanks.”43 The tanks Kissinger saw on his visit to Zaire in 1976 were most likely delivered prior to
China’s withdraw from the conflict in October 1975 and belonged to the Zairian army not the
FNLA/UNITA coalition. Kissinger’s claims that China continued providing military aid via
Zaire after October 1975 are further disputed by numerous other intelligence reports. A National
Intelligence Bulletin from November 1975 stated: “Peking reportedly has placed restrictions on
Zairian army use of Chinese-supplied artillery to support Front units in Angola.”44 If China did
not want previously delivered military equipment used in Angola, why would they continue to
supply weapons to the FNLA/UNITA coalition as Kissinger claimed?
The next time U.S. and Chinese officials discussed Angola was May of 1976, after the
MPLA won control of Angola. Kissinger defended U.S. policy in Angola while the Chinese were
highly critical. Kissinger stated, “we are not going to permit another Angola to develop… The
Secretary of Defense will go to Zaire in July to discuss military assistance to that country. We
are working closely with Zambia and other countries.” Huang Chen, chief of China’s Liaison
Office, responded “Frankly speaking, we think the United States should learn a lesson from
Angola.” Huang continued, “the fact that the military situation in Angola developed to the point
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it did is inseparable from U.S. policy towards the Soviets. U.S. policy abetted the Soviet efforts.”
It is clear that Huang believes the U.S. did not do enough to restrain the Soviets in Angola. In
response, Kissinger blamed Congress for not allowing the U.S. to do what was necessary to
contain the Soviets. “We would have defeated the Soviets in Angola if Congress had not stopped
our assistance,” he declared.45
Three months later the U.S. is still on the defensive dealing with the Chinese. Huang
remarked to Kissinger, “I have the impression that Soviet influence has been expanding in an
even more pronounced way in Africa.” Kissinger agreed and defended U.S. policy in Africa
stating that the U.S. provided weapons to Zaire and Kenya in an attempt to stem Soviet
expansion in Africa. Yet despite Kissinger’s attempted reassurance Huang is still critical of the
America strategy towards the Soviet Union: “a policy of détente with the Soviet Union is less
and less effective.”46 The U.S. and China still did not see eye to eye on Angola two months later
during an exchange in New York City. Chiao Kuan-hua, China’s Foreign Minister, referred back
to Helsinki and the U.S. policy of “appeasing” the Soviets, which led to an MPLA victory in
Angola. Chiao asserted that, “After Helsinki the Soviets went on a large scale offensive in
Angola and we believe this was caused by the weak attitude you adopted at Helsinki toward the
Soviets.” Again, Chiao is on the offensive and the Kissinger is forced to defend U.S. policies.
Kissinger stated U.S. policy in Africa: “What we want—and it is a complicated process—is to
create a basis for resisting Soviet intervention while not obstructing liberation movements.”47
However, Chiao is not buying what Kissinger is selling. “Just not opposing liberation
movements is not enough,” he responded. Kissinger countered by insisting the U.S. supported
liberation movements. But Chiao still had his doubts, “You are not thoroughgoing, speaking
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quite frankly.” He continued, “I don’t want to go into details, but your efforts are only half
measures. You may keep on trying, but you may find that the result is the opposite of what you
expect. You may end up angering the blacks.”48 Despite assuring the Chinese for a year neither
Ford nor Kissinger could convince China’s leaders that the U.S. was committed to restraining the
Soviets in Africa. Furthermore, Chiao’s prediction proves true, future U.S. policy in Africa,
specifically, continuing support of UNITA and improved relations with apartheid South Africa
would prove unpopular.
As the conversation continued Chinese criticism of détente becomes more acute. Chiao
stated, “Our view is that the Soviets, through Helsinki, see your weakness.” Kissinger
acknowledged U.S. “weakness” replying “we are temporarily weak until after our elections. We
have gone through a period of temporary weakness when the forces which overthrew Nixon have
been dominant in this country.” Yet Chiao persists, “The Soviets, through Helsinki, have come to
feel that the West is anxious to reach agreement. This is a long-range problem and nothing very
terrible but it is a fact that the Soviets have reached such a conclusion.”49 It seems the U.S. and
China had come to a head regarding Angola and détente. No matter how much money the U.S.
threw into Angola China kept pressuring them for more, essentially burdening them to fight a
battle they started. Furthermore, no matter how much the U.S. tried to convince the Chinese that
détente was not appeasement or that China should resume aid to the FNLA/UNITA coalition, the
Chinese would not budge.
Motives Behind China’s Angolan Policies
Yet to decipher the motives behind China’s policies in Angola, namely, the undermining of
the Alvor Agreement, its insistence on U.S. intervention, condemnation of détente, and reversal
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of triangular diplomacy one must see the events from China’s perspective. During the Angolan
conflict the U.S. was going through a period of weakness, as asserted by Chiao and
acknowledged by Kissinger. Within the span of a few years the U.S. had been defeated in
Vietnam and suffered through the Watergate scandal all while enduring an OPEC initiated
energy crisis, an economic recession, and a series of Congressional hearings lamenting the covert
actions of the CIA that resulted in the Clark Amendment. It would seem, as a result of these
series of crises, that the U.S. would fold into itself in what Kissinger called “a watered-down
version of Wilsonianism.”50 Mao Zedong voiced these concerns to Kissinger as early as 1973
when he asked if the Watergate scandal could possibly lead to the election of Democrats who
would “adopt the policy of isolationism.”51 However, it was in China’s best interest that the U.S.
not pursue a policy of isolationism during the 1970s.
It was in China’s best interest that the Cold War continue as usual, that is, the U.S.
continue its policy of Third World interventions to combat supposed “communists” who were
sometimes backed by the Soviets. The more the Soviets and Americans battled each other for
influence in far off places the less resources the Soviets could devote to undermining or invading
China. In laymen’s terms every gun the Soviets committed to battling the Americans was one
less gun to put on the Sino-Soviet border. Moreover, with the U.S. and Soviet Union conducting
proxy wars throughout the Third World China could continue denouncing foreign imperialism
and present itself as a legitimate third option to developing countries, and developing economies.
This policy of pressuring the U.S. to continue its Third World interventions allowed China to
emerge unscathed from the Angolan crisis and focus its attention at home on issues such as
political succession and strengthening border defenses.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50
51

!

Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 830.
Memorandum of Conversation, 12 November 1973, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 18, 398.!

21!

Furthermore, Chinese policy in the Angolan crisis was tied to the Chinese Cultural
Revolution, which lasted from 1966-1976. During the Angolan crisis, which coincided with the
twilight of the Cultural Revolution, China, like the U.S., was going through a period of
weakness. As a result of the political turmoil that marred the Cultural Revolution and the
deteriorating health of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, China’s two most prominent leaders, China
faced serious domestic concerns regarding the succession of top leadership in the CCP. By the
mid 1970s Zhou’s health was failing and he died in January 1976. Likewise, Mao was in his 80s
during the Angolan crisis and after his death in September 1976 the political leadership of the
CCP was in shambles due to the various purges of the Cultural Revolution. A power struggle
ensued after Mao’s death leading to the arrest of the “Gang of Four,” the most radical members
of Mao’s inner circle. The deteriorating health conditions of China’s top two leaders and the
issue of their succession led China to focus on domestic concerns, rather than competing for
influence in the Third World against the Soviets. No doubt the CCP was more concerned about
Mao’s successor than the Soviets gaining a foothold in Angola; a task they passed off to the
Americans. Furthermore, with the impending death of China’s top leaders the smartest move for
the Chinese was to pull away from the Angolan conflict and cover all its bases by extending
“warm congratulations” to the new MPLA led Angolan government while at the same time
condemning the foreign interference of the U.S. and Soviet Union.52
China’s economy during the Cultural Revolution especially from 1973-1975, its most
involved period in the Angolan conflict, can also shed light on its policy decisions during the
Angolan crisis. During the last years of the Cultural Revolution China experienced remarkable
industrial growth. Yet there was a catch, although “Significant achievements were scored in
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industry” the Cultural Revolution was also “responsible for the most severe setback and the
heaviest losses suffered by the [Chinese Communist] Party, the state and the people since the
founding of the People’s Republic.”53 During China’s participation in the Angolan conflict its
“Indices of Gross Industrial Output Value” increased 16 percent.54 This shows that China had the
industrial capability to continue supplying the FNLA/UNITA coalition, but chose to allow the
U.S. shoulder the burden while China focused on domestic concerns. The FNLA/UNITA
coalition were not the only ones feeling the squeeze and China also drastically cut its military aid
to North Vietnam.55 While China was cutting its military aid to the Third World in 1975 it
increased its “Expenditure for National Defense” roughly 9 million Yuan from the previous
year.56 This further illustrates the shift in China’s policies during the latter years of the Cultural
Revolution and Angolan crisis, from competing with the Soviets for influence in the Third World
to focusing on the domestic issues of political succession and possible Soviet invasion.
Though the Soviet Union and China were both communist countries they became bitter
rivals in the 1950s after the death of Joesph Stalin and the rise of revisionist Soviet leaders, who
were highly critical of Stalin’s policies. The Soviet Union and China also disagreed about their
mutual border, and the Sino-Soviet border dispute became violent in late 1960s when armed
conflict broke out and claimed both Soviet and Chinese causalities.57 The renewed threat of a
Soviet attack was one of the reasons the Chinese sought rapprochement with the U.S., using the
U.S. as a counter balance to the Soviets. During the earliest exchanges between U.S. and Chinese
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diplomats Deng Xiaoping claimed that the Soviets were attempting to “encircle” China.58 The
possibility of a Soviet attack continued to be a determinate in Chinese policy during the Angolan
crisis. In 1974, as Chinese military advisors trained the FNLA in Zaire Deng told Kissinger, “the
Soviet policy of hostility against China has not changed.” He continued, “The threats that they
continue to use are military threat and subversion.”59 Though the Chinese were concerned about
Soviet expansionism in Angola, they had to focus on the more pressing matter of a possible
Soviet invasion of China. Therefore, China prodded the U.S. into escalating the conflict in
Angola rather than commit its own resources, which would be better spent protecting China’s
borders and though U.S. officials tried their upmost to bring China back into Angola, their efforts
were mute.
Furthermore, as the Sino-Soviet split widened the Soviets and Chinese began to compete
for influence in the Third World. In a 1974 UN General Assembly Meeting, Deng declared that
the Soviet Union and U.S. compromised the First World, Europe made up the Second World,
while the nations of Africa, Latin America, and Asia (excluding Japan) were part of the Third
World.60 Mao Zedong identified China as a Third World country due to China’s history of
economic exploitation at the hands of colonial powers. He also saw China as a leader of the
Third World because it had shed this exploitation while the Soviet Union had become an
imperial power exploiting its client states in Eastern Europe.61 Additionally, the rhetoric of the
Chinese Cultural Revolution, “implied the radicalization of China’s foreign policy interests,”62
and compelled China to assist those struggling for independence in the Third World. China also
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aspired to become a member of the United Nations and saw Africa as the perfect place to secure
the votes necessary for UN membership. Hence, the involvement of South Africa weighed
heavily on China’s decision to withdraw from the Angolan conflict and outsource its support of
the FNLA and UNITA to the U.S.
Though South Africa intervened in Angola on the side of China’s allies, the FNLA/UNITA
coalition, China would not align its interests in with South Africa for two reasons. Firstly, South
Africa’s apartheid government was based on the racial supremacy of whites in a country and
continent where the vast majority of the population was black. This made South Africa very
unpopular in regional and international politics. Secondly, South Africa was a colonial power
and maintained an iron grip over its colony Namibia. The South West People’s Organization or
SWAPO, a nationalist liberation movement, challenged South Africa’s colonial rule in Namibia.
Though SWAPO received most of its aid from the Soviets they were “by no means anti-Chinese.
SWAPO volunteers had been trained in China since the early sixties.”63 China could not continue
supporting the FNLA and UNITA in Angola after the coalition allied with South Africa, this
would fundamentally undermined its position with SWAPO and the anti-colonial, anti-racist64
rhetoric of the Cultural Revolution.
Still, South Africa’s invasion of Angola provided China with a concrete reason for denying
repeated U.S. requests that China continue aiding and training the FNLA/UNITA coalition.
Moreover, South Africa’s meddling in the Angolan Civil War gave China the pretext to leave the
conflict and focus on political succession in the CCP and strengthening the Sino-Soviet border.
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China also showed possible allies in Africa that it would never ally with apartheid South Africa,
despite its feverish anti-Soviet policies. Though the Chinese played a crucial role in escalating
the Angolan conflict they withdrew when it became clear other foreign powers, namely the U.S.,
South Africa, Soviet Union, and Cuba were stepping up their aid to Angola’s liberation
movements in 1975.
Foreign Aid, Intervention, and Escalation
The first Angolan liberation movement to receive foreign aid was Neto’s MPLA. In 1958
the MPLA received “verbal support and a limited amount of material aid from both the PRC and
the Soviet Union.”65 During the 1960s MPLA delegations visited and studied in both Beijing and
Moscow. However, the MPLA refused to take sides in the Sino-Soviet conflict, was plagued
with internal factionalism, and received little support from the competing communist nations. As
a result, Yugoslavia, who acted independently of the Soviet Union, emerged as the MPLA’s
closest ally until 1974. Yet in 1971, Neto visited China and twelve MPLA commanders received
military and political training there.66 Up until 1973 China was truly neutral, extending training
and limited aid to all three Angolan liberation movements. Moreover, in June 1975 while the
MPLA and FNLA clashed in Angola, the Chinese invited a MPLA delegation to Beijing in an
attempt to “establish a degree of influence in all three Angolan nationalist groups.”67 Though
China committed itself to the FNLA and UNITA in 1973 it still kept the door open to relations
with the MPLA. This put China in a much more advantageous position than the U.S. after the
MPLA’s victory in 1976.
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The Soviet Union, like China, provided limited aid and vocal support to the MPLA in the
late 1950s. In contrast to China, however, the Soviet Union did not lend assistance to the FNLA
or UNITA, preferring to stay on the side of those who proclaimed to be Marxists. Soviet aid to
the MPLA prior to late 1974 was paltry at best due to animosity within the group. For instance,
in 1972 a high ranking member of the group, Daniel Chipenda, became disappointed with the
MPLA after Portuguese scorched earth attacks in eastern Angola and led an “Eastern Revolt”
against the “intellectuals, mulattos, whites, and northerners in the MPLA.”68 Chipenda would
eventually defect to the FNLA, taking a band of supporters with him.
Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador to the U.S., claimed Moscow’s aid to the
MPLA was “withdrawn when the movement became locked in its own internal struggles.”69
However, Soviet documents show that during Chipenda’s revolt assistance to the MPLA
amounted to “a trickle of military and financial support.”70 Furthermore, the Soviets did not trust
the MPLA due to their ties and open communication with the Chinese. From the late 1950s to
early 1970s the Soviets took a cautious approach to supporting the MPLA, only increasing their
aid when China began arming the MPLA’s rivals in 1973. In late 1974 the Soviets established a
generous aid package for the MPLA and arms began arriving in early 1975, just in time undercut
the principles of the Alvor Agreement. As the war escalated in 1975 the Soviets committed
heavy weapons, ammunition, tanks, and fighter planes to the MPLA, often using Cuba as an
intermediary.
The fact that the Soviets moved in Angola in response to the Chinese, and not the U.S. is
noteworthy. According to Westad, “Soviet experts did not believe that the United States would
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stage a massive intervention… Their main worry was the Chinese, who had stepped up their
FNLA assistance program from bases in Zaire.”71 Through Soviet documents, Westad shows that
the U.S. became involved in a conflict that was originally a proxy war between Beijing and
Moscow. Yet in the end, the United States did China’s dirty work, combating the Soviets and
Cubans after China withdrew in October of 1975. Though China started an arms race in Angola
by committing significant amounts of arms and military instructors to the FNLA they abandoned
their assistance when apartheid South Africa and the U.S. became more involved in the conflict.
Nudging the Soviets along in Angola was Cuba’s Fidel Castro, who had aided multiple
African liberation movements since the early 1960s. In contrast to their allies in Moscow, Cuba
took a more active role in Angola training MPLA soldiers in Congo during the mid 1960s.
However, “the Cubans were disappointed in the military performance of the MPLA and critical
of the failure of its leaders to join guerillas in the field.”72 A rift developed between Cuba and the
MPLA and after the departure of Cuban advisors in 1967 relations between the two faded. Cuba
turned its attention to more successful African liberation movements in Guinea and Cape Verde.
Still, during Cuba’s misadventure with the MPLA in Congo they planted the seeds for future
cooperation. Castro would only re-enter the fold, at the request of Neto,73 after the Soviet Union
made a major commitment to the MPLA in 1975. In November 1975, Castro sent his special
forces into Angola to combat South Africa who invaded Angola to supposedly protect an
infrastructure investment but began advancing into the Angolan heartland. Castro remarked that,
“The objective was for the racist South African forces coming from the south to meet up with
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Mobutu’s mercenaries from the north and occupy Luanda.”74 Cuba would eventually commit
thousands of troops, substantial amounts of military hardware, and the Cuban/MPLA army
would eventually rout the FNLA, UNITA, Zaire, and South Africa effectively winning Angola
for the MPLA.
The FNLA was the next movement to garner outside external support. Zaire was the
FNLA’s first foreign sympathizer and allowed the FNLA to set up exile military bases in its
territory. Zaire gave the FNLA arms, uniforms, and used its air force to shuttle the FNLA around
Angola.75 Furthermore, Zaire’s leader, Mobutu Sese Seko, had been lobbying the U.S. for a more
active policy in Angola and warning of the dangers the communist MPLA posed since 1970.76
Mobutu also used his influence with the U.S. government to assert the credentials of his brother
in law, Holden Roberto. In 1975 more than 1,000 Zairian troops joined the FNLA in its war
against the MPLA in Angola.77
However, Zaire was not the only country to aid the FNLA. In 1963 Chinese Foreign
Minister Chen Yi promised aid to Roberto and the FNLA. Roberto announced he would travel to
China within a month but it took ten years. When Roberto finally did travel to Beijing in 1973,
Zaire had diplomatically recognized China and received a thirty-year interest free loan.78
Displaying their new alliance with both Zaire and the FNLA, 450 tons of Chinese weapons
earmarked for the FNLA arrived in Zaire in 1973 and 112 Chinese military advisors arrived the
following year.79 Though China was the first foreign country to introduce considerable amounts
of military aid and advisors to an Angola liberation movement, it was also the first to back out.
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After South Africa set its sights on Luanda in October 1975 and subsequently allied with the
FNLA and UNITA, China withdrew. If China wanted to maintain its self imposed reputation as a
leader of the Third World it could not align its interests with apartheid South Africa, the most
hated nation in the region.
Holden Roberto also received covert assistance from the U.S. government since the
Kennedy administration. Roberto “had met with the new President while he was still a senator
and, like many African nationalists, had admired him for his public support for the cause of
Algerian independence.”80 During the Kennedy administration the U.S. denounced Portuguese
colonialism and Roberto had been receiving a small “subsistence” fund since at least 1961. This
subsistence fund was “in return for specific information and under no circumstances in a
magnitude to permit the purchase of arms.”81 However, Kennedy had to walk a diplomatic
tightrope: Portugal was a vital NATO ally and use of its Azores military base was of crucial
importance to the U.S. The Azores islands provided a key refueling point for the U.S. Air Force
and Navy on the long journey between the U.S. and Europe. In the end, Kennedy sided with
Portugal and “edged back into the NATO fold” as Portugal “had successfully set such a policy
retreat as its price for continued American use of the strategic Azores base.”82
UNITA was the last liberation movement to receive foreign aid, Savimbi established
contact with the Chinese early and in 1964 traveled to China where he and a few of his followers
were trained in guerilla warfare and politics at Nanking Military Academy.83 He proved an astute
learner and prolonged the Angolan Civil War until his death in 2002. Savimbi was also a
diplomatic chameleon playing to whoever would give him aid. When receiving aid from the
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Chinese during the 1960s and 1970s he opposed the Soviet Union and praised Maoism. Yet
during the 1980s, when Savimbi received aid from the U.S., he presented himself to President
Reagan as a staunch anti-communist and advocate of the free market.
Like the Soviet Union, the United States was at first reluctant to get involved in Angola
during the 1970s. But after the Soviets augmented their aid to the MPLA in late 1974 the CIA
began to covertly fund the MPLA’s rivals. Just as the ink on the Alvor Agreement was drying,
on 23 January 1975 the “40 Committee,” the National Security Council sub-committee on covert
affairs, approved an initial $300,000 for the FNLA and massively increased funding later that
year in response to increased battles between the FNLA and MPLA. Dubbed Operation
IAFEATURE the 40 Committee authorized payment of $14 million to both the FNLA and
UNITA to combat the Soviet-Cuban backed MPLA in July of 1975. The CIA also lent aid to
mercenaries to assist the FNLA/UNITA coalition.84
However, when word of a covert intervention in Angola leaked to the press the CIA
began to take flak from both Congress and the American public. Leslie Gelb of the New York
Times first broke the story in September of 1975. Gelb’s article is more informative than
opinionated and focuses on the amount and type of military aid the U.S. and China were
funneling through Zaire. It also highlighted that the Soviets were delivering significant amounts
of weapons to the MPLA.85 Commentary on the CIA’s Angola operation took a more critical
turn within a few months and began to draw comparisons to Vietnam. The New York Times
remarked, “Angola is rapidly escalating into an international conflict reminiscent of Vietnam and
United States spokesmen are grossly distorting the real issues involved.”86 With evidence of CIA
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intervention and public pressure mounting the U.S. was forced to withdraw their support of the
FNLA and UNITA in 1976.
The U.S. also coordinated their support of the FNLA/UNITA coalition with their regional
allies, Zaire and South Africa, who were adamant communism not gain a foothold in Angola.
Under the guise of protecting the Calueque Dam in southern Angola, South African troops rolled
into Angola in August 1975 and occupied the site.87 The dam was financed by South Africa and
provided electricity and water to South Africa’s colony Namibia, which bordered Angola to the
south. R. F. Botha, South Africa’s representative to the United Nations justified the invasion
stating, “arrangements were made with the Portuguese authorities for them to assume protection
of the Calueque Dam, and for South Africa to carry out the task until they arrived.”88 However,
Portugal’s ambassador, Jose Manuel Galvo Teles, disputed South Africa’s claim and asserted
South African troops entered Angola “with neither the knowledge nor advance authorization of
the Portuguese Government.” Teles continued, “the affirmation that the Portuguese Government
had asked South Africa to remain in the Calueque area and to continue to assume the safety of
work in progress at the dam, is completely without foundation.”89 South Africa’s penetration into
southern Angola was welcomed by UNITA, who operated in the southeastern portion of Angola.
But South Africa would not stop at the Calueque area in southern Angola. South Africa’s
military began pushing further into Angola to assure it would not have a communist neighbor to
the north. On 14 October 1975 South African troops started moving north to Angola’s capital,
Luanda, covering “forty to forty-five miles a day.” South Africa’s invasion force, codenamed
Zulu, was “composed of more than 1,000 black Angolans and a smaller number of white South
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Africa soldiers.”90 Despite the fact that South Africa was the regional pariah, a state based on the
racial supremacy of whites, Washington coordinated their efforts with the South African
military. This alliance caused a congressional inquiry and U.S. Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger lied to Congress about U.S. collaboration with South Africa.91
Neither the U.S. nor China wanted to be publicly linked to South Africa’s involvement in
Angola or seen as supporting the FNLA/UNITA coalition that South Africa was fighting
alongside. South Africa invaded Angola on 14 October and China withdrew their advisors to the
FNLA thirteen days later. China’s goal in Africa was to lend aid to nationalist liberation
movements, hoping that when those nations became independent China could rely on their votes
for UN membership and investment opportunities. Aligning their interests in Angola with South
Africa would have created an anti-Chinese backlash in the region, costing China valuable allies
in the developing world. China had withdrawn from an arms race it effectively started two years
ago by introducing large amounts of arms and instructors into Zaire for the FNLA. Not only had
China withdrawn when the fighting started to heat up, it left the U.S., Zaire, and South Africa to
support the FNLA/UNITA coalition.
The U.S. acknowledged the possibility of China outsourcing its role supporting Third
World liberation movements to other more technologically advanced countries as early as
November 1974. An Army intelligence report assessing Chinese aid to Third World liberation
movements the stated that due to China’s outdated military technology it might try to “find
sufficient other clients to maintain a military assistance program at current levels.” Furthermore,
China limited its aid to Third World clients to focus on “domestic political affairs and the threat
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of Soviet military action against the PRC.”92 Despite their accurate assessment the U.S. failed to
connect the dots and realize that it would soon become a “sufficient client to maintain military
assistance” to the FNLA and UNITA while China saved face and focused on domestic politics
and the Soviet menace on their border.
After China withdrew its advisors to the FNLA, the CIA reached similar conclusions
regarding the situation in Angola: “As long as other countries maintain their current levels of
assistance to the National Front and National Union,” the CIA reported in a December 1975
National Intelligence Bulletin, “China can be expected to maintain a low profile… and score
propaganda points at Moscow’s expense.”93 China did just that at a United Nations General
Assembly plenary meeting on 8 December 1975. Huang Hua, China’s representative to the
United Nations, stated that the Soviets “deliberately created division among the three Angolan
liberation organizations, one-sidedly supporting one and attacking the other two.” What the CIA
did not realize was that China also scored propaganda points at its expense as well, as China
denounced all foreign intervention in Angola. Huang remarked, “Angola was entirely the result
of the rivalry between the super-powers” and the U.S. “had not lagged behind and was getting
actively involved; it had even incited the South Africa authorities to direct intervention in
Angola.”94 However, while China condemned U.S. interference in Angola publicly, the Chinese
encouraged it in private meetings with U.S. authorities. Furthermore, while China had been
denouncing Soviet and American imperialism in the Third World for years, the Angolan crisis
spurred their discourse into overdrive.
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The CCP ensured Chinese citizens were well aware of super-power imperialism in Africa
and the threat détente posed to the world. A Peking Review article from early 1976 stated:
“behind the smokescreen of ‘détente,’ both superpowers stepped up their rivalry for world
domination and quickened their pace towards a new world war.” Furthermore, “In its contention
for hegemony with the other superpower, the Soviet Union instigated and kept intensifying the
civil war in Angola. The other superpower had no desire to be outdone.”95 Despite the new
American-Chinese relationship and China’s insistence that the U.S. escalate its aid to the
FNLA/UNITA coalition, China, still adhering to the rhetoric of the Cultural Revolution, publicly
admonished the “imperialism” of the U.S.
With Angola quickly becoming a proxy war between Washington and Moscow, China
could not afford to get caught up in a conflict of détente. Furthermore, détente was not in China’s
best interest. High tensions between the Soviets and U.S., and their competition for influence in
the Third World compelled the Soviets to focus their resources on battling the Americans, not the
Chinese. Moreover, China could continue denouncing super power imperialism in the Third
World. During multiple meetings with U.S. diplomats in 1975 Chinese officials compared the
Helsinki Accords to the appeasement of Nazi Germany during the 1930s.96 If China saw the U.S.
strategy of détente as appeasing Soviet expansionism, why would they continue to support the
same side as the U.S. in the Angolan conflict? For all China knew the U.S. would appease the
Soviets in Angola and with China supporting the same side as the U.S., China in turn would look
weak vis-à-vis the Soviets. China’s interests would be better served pressuring the U.S. to
combat the Soviets in Angola as it had more pressing matters to deal with at home, namely, the
succession of dying leaders in the CCP and the growing threat on the Sino-Soviet border.
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As much as the Chinese detested détente they were eager to play the U.S. off against the
Soviets. As early as 1973 China pointed out that triangular diplomacy enabled the U.S. to “reach
out to the Soviet Union by standing on Chinese shoulders.”97 Now it was time for the Chinese to
reach out against the Soviets by standing on America’s shoulders. China did this by pulling its
advisors and aid from the FNLA/UNITA coalition and allowing the U.S. and its regional allies to
risk their time, money, and international prestige battling the Soviet and Cuban-backed MPLA.
China timed its withdrawal from Angola beautifully, just as more foreign powers were
intervening China left and allowed them to shoulder the burden.
But shortly after China left the conflict the MPLA, despite the efforts of the U.S., Zaire,
and South Africa, gained the upper hand after the battle of Quifangondo, a village just outside of
Luanda. The battle became a turning point in the war and shifted momentum to the MPLA. It
was fought on 10 November and with Angolan’s independence scheduled for the next day it
became clear that whoever held the capital, Luanda, would emerge as the leader of the newly
independent nation of Angola. With Cuban and MPLA soldiers occupying defensive positions in
Luanda and Quifangondo, it was their battle to lose. Quifangondo was “protected on all sides” by
marshes, the Bengo River to its northwest, a lone bridge spanning the river, and single road
leading into the village.98 MPLA and Cuban troops occupied a small hill south of Quifangondo
giving them a perfect view of the approaching enemy. As South African soldiers, Portuguese
mercenaries, and FNLA troops marched towards the Bengo River they were slaughtered by a
rain of heavy artillery. Their route became known as “Death’s Road.” The next day, 11
November 1975, the People’s Republic of Angola (PRA) was established by the MPLA with
Agostinho Neto as president.
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Though the MPLA continued to battle the FNLA/UNITA coalition by late December and
early January, with foreign aid tapering off, the FNLA/UNITA alliance broke down and they
began battling each other.99 Squabbling between the FNLA and UNITA made them easy targets
for the MPLA/Cuban army. The FNLA folded and eventually assimilated into Angola as a
political party, UNITA, however, did not. Savimbi went underground and waged a brutal guerilla
war, funded by the U.S. during the 1980s, against the Angolan government until his death in
2002. In contrast, shortly after Angola became independent in November of 1975 China
extended “warm congratulations on this victory to the Angolan people and all three Angolan
liberation movements.” Though China condemned “the rivalry between the two superpowers”100
in Angola even while encouraging U.S. interference in private, they ran a savvy public relations
campaign that left the possibility of relations with the new Angolan government wide open. The
U.S. on the other hand did not, and their image in Africa would continue to deteriorate.
Soon after the establishment of the MPLA led People’s Republic of Angola the Ford
administration lost its campaign for support in Angola. Operation IAFEATURE came out of the
CIA’s budget and therefore needed no congressional approval. However, with the funds of
IAFEATURE depleted any additional money had to be approved by Congress. But Congress and
the American public were reluctant to intervene in another Third World conflict so soon after the
Vietnam debacle, effectively handcuffing President Ford’s ability to restrain the Soviets in
Angola. On 19 December 1975 the Senate “overwhelmingly” passed the Clark Amendment
instituting a “cutoff for funds of covert military support operations in Angola.” Ford called the
decision a “deep tragedy for all countries whose security depends on the United States.” The
passing of the Clark Amendment also ignited a debate about “the role Congress should play in
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determining foreign policy, and especially in determining and controlling covert intelligence
operations.”101 Though the Clark Amendment was passed in late 1975, U.S. aid to the FNLA and
UNITA continued until April of 1976.102
Henry Kissinger was particularly vexed by Congress’ lack of support in Angola.
Kissinger commented that the Congress of 1975 “represented the high point of the radical
protest.” Furthermore, “It was violently opposed to intervention abroad, especially in the
developing world, ever suspicious of the CIA, deeply hostile to covert operations, and distrustful
of the veracity of the executive branch.”103 Yet, the skepticism of Congress, the American public,
and the Senate was well justified after the embarrassment of Vietnam and the abuse of executive
power during the Nixon years, something Kissinger failed to comprehend. As a result of Clark
Amendment the CIA began shopping for more mercenaries, some of them Portuguese, and while
these mercenaries were paid in advance they did little fighting.104
The CIA was not alone. With the FNLA’s foreign funds running low Roberto hired 150
British and American mercenaries, with U.S. money of course.105 Those Americans who were
recruited returned home in coffins, if at all. Yet the move to utilize mercenaries in the Angolan
conflict, especially white and/or Portuguese mercenaries, was short sighted at best and idiotic at
worst. John Stockwell, a CIA officer who operated in Angola at the time, acknowledged this
with remarkable clarity. Stockwell commented, “The black Angolans had just won a bloody
fifteen-year struggle against the Portuguese. To ally ourselves with the same Portuguese losers,
especially when the Soviets were represented in Angola by popular Cuban revolutionaries, was
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the height of foolishness.”106 Between hiring white Portuguese mercenaries and colluding with
apartheid South Africa the U.S. proved it had absolutely no grasp on the political, social, and
most importantly, racial attitudes of everyday Africans.
Recognition of Angola and Effects of the War
The war between the FNLA, UNITA, and MPLA had a profound effect on Angola. After
the MPLA’s victory the People’s Republic of Angola was admitted to the Organization of
African Unity on 11 February 1976. International recognition came shortly thereafter and by 20
February Angola had been “recognized by some 70 countries including the major Western
countries except the United States.” France, who apparently was committing weapons to fight
the MPLA just three months earlier, was the first Western country to recognize the MPLA led
Angolan government. France was followed by Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, the Federal
Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom. The United Kingdom and Canada, two of America’s most stalwart allies,
“accompanied the recognition with the withdraw of all foreign forces in Angola.”107 Though this
was pointed foremost at Cuba and South Africa it applied to the U.S. as well, the CIA continued
to provide support to the FNLA and UNITA until April of 1976.
Angola’s path to United Nations membership would be more tumultuous than its
admittance to the OAU and recognition by other countries. Though Angola first applied for UN
membership on 22 April 1976, “final approval of the application would have to await the
beginning of the 31st General Assembly sessions” in September.108 When September rolled
around only two countries opposed Angola’s admittance to the UN, the U.S. and China. The U.S.
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claimed, “it still had serious doubts about the true independence of the Angolan Government. It
was hard to reconcile the presence of a massive contingent of Cuban troops.” Likewise, China
argued, “although Angola won its independence, its internal affairs were still being subjected to
crude interference… by what China termed Soviet social-imperialism.”109
Both Cuba and the Soviet Union responded by asserting that the Angolan government
requested their aid and presence. Other UN members remarked, “Many United Nations Member
States had foreign troops on their soil… and the requirements for admission said nothing about
foreign troops.” Furthermore, “Angola was an independent and sovereign country and had the
right to request assistance from any State.” The People’s Republic of Angola was officially
admitted to UN on 1 December 1976 by a vote of 116 to 0 with only the U.S. absenting, China
did not vote.110 China’s position on Angola’s UN membership did not sour relations between the
two and China would formalize relations with Angola in 1983. The U.S. on the other hand,
attempted to overthrow the internationally recognized Angolan government via Jonas Savimbi
and UNITA during the 1980s.
UNITA’s guerilla war against the Angolan government would last twenty-six long years
for two reasons: natural resources and foreign aid. Diamonds mined or stolen by UNITA were
sold on the black market to fund their war effort. Likewise, hefty profits and taxes from the
lucrative Angolan oil industry were used to support the Angolan government, including the
military. Furthermore, Cubans troops stayed on in Angola until 1991 assisting the PRA and
supplying weapons. UNITA, on the other hand found allies in U.S. President Ronald Reagan,
who deemed Savimbi a freedom fighter, and apartheid South Africa. UNITA’s foreign
sympathizers kept Savimbi’s group well armed during the 1980s. Furthermore, UNITA
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
109
110

!

The Yearbook of the United Nations 1976, 305-311.
Ibid, 305-311.

40!

stockpiled weapons it received from the U.S. and South Africa, which allowed Savimbi to keep
fighting throughout the 1990s when foreign aid dried up.
As the Angolan Civil War continued casualties mounted and reports of extensive human
rights violations by both sides began coming out of Angola. The Angolan authorities imprisoned
thousands of suspected government opponents, some which of were “presented at public rallies
or press conferences and reportedly compelled to make self incriminating statements.”111 In 1985
Amnesty International reported “arbitrary detention by UNITA forces of civilians not involved in
the armed conflict.”112 UNITA was also accused of torturing prisoners and Savimbi was
notorious for eliminating rivals within the group to consolidate his power. In 1992 Angola got a
glimpse of democracy and held elections that were deemed legitimate by international
observers.113 However, Savimbi lost, declared the elections fraudulent, and though a run-off was
scheduled UNITA returned to the battlefield. The war would only end in 2002 when Savimbi
was killed by government forces in the southeastern countryside. For all intensive purposes
China unleashed a monster on Angola when they began supporting Savimbi during the 1960s.
Yet while China unleashed the monster it was the U.S. who sustained him through the 1970s and
1980s.
During the Cold War U.S. policy in Angola was a series of failures. In 1976 restrained by a
Congress skeptical of Third World interventions, the U.S. failed to defeat the MPLA via its
proxies the FNLA and UNITA. After the MPLA’s victory the U.S. could not stop international
recognition of the People’s Republic of Angola. Ronald Reagan’s efforts to dethrone the MPLA
led Angolan government during the 1980s also resulted in failure. U.S. efforts came to a
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
111

Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 1985 (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1985),
17.
112
Ibid, 18.
113
Bauer and Taylor, Politics in Southern Africa, 159.!

!

41!

democratic climax in the 1992 Angolan elections where UNITA could finally prove its
legitimacy as a political movement. However, when a majority of the Angolan people decided
they did not want to be represented by Jonas Savimbi, Reagan’s freedom fighter stormed back to
the Angolan bush and took up arms, losing what little credibility he had left.
While the MPLA led People’s Republic of Angola did not have a stellar human rights
record it was still an internationally recognized government and efforts to destabilize the PRA
clearly prompted further government crackdowns on human rights. Furthermore, the fact that
Savimbi did not respect the 1992 election results showed he was never interested in democracy,
just ruling Angola with an iron fist much like he did with UNITA. In contrast, instead of trying
to overthrow the Angolan government the Chinese attempted to work with Angola. They opened
diplomatic relations with Angola in 1983 and became one of the major foreign investors in
Africa’s infrastructure despite starting an arms race in Angola in the early 1970s.
Conclusion
The Angolan Civil War proved a vital episode in the Cold War for the U.S., China, and
Soviet Union. In the U.S. the Angolan conflict largely sounded the death toll for the policy of
détente and after Jimmy Carter’s election as President in 1976 one of the chief architects of
détente, Henry Kissinger, was removed as Secretary of State. Moreover, after Ronald Reagan’s
election in 1980 he pursued a foreign policy, characterized by the Reagan Doctrine that was
largely the polar opposite of détente. Under Reagan tensions with the Soviets were notoriously
high and for Reagan “détente was perpetuating the Cold War rather than hastening its end.”114
The Reagan Doctrine was a return to the classical, at times fanatical, anti-communism that
classified early U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War. Still, Reagan’s eagerness to battle the
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Soviets led to alliances with notoriously corrupt and brutal organizations in the Third World,
namely UNITA, apartheid South Africa, the Nicaraguan Contras, and the Afghan mujahedeen.
China, on the other hand, was affected much differently by the Angolan Civil War. For
China the Angolan conflict showed that despite the new U.S.-Chinese rapprochement China
would not sacrifice its overall foreign policy goals in the Third World for the sake of the United
States. If the U.S. wanted to ally with unpopular characters such as apartheid South Africa or
Jonas Savimbi, it could go right on doing so, but would receive no support from China in the
process. Moreover, China proved it could manipulate U.S. fears of the Soviet Union to its
advantage and encourage the U.S. to carry out foreign policy initiatives against the Soviets that
would have been detrimental to China’s interests in the developing world had China pursued
those policies itself. Angola also represented the different Cold War worldviews China and the
U.S. held. China saw the People’s Republic of Angola not as a Soviet puppet, but as a nation
filled with abundant natural resources, a potential ally, and a place where Soviet interests in the
region could be undermined with appropriate developmental aid. On the other hand, the U.S. saw
the PRA as simply a Soviet client that needed to be violently overthrown.
However, China’s willingness to provide developmental aid to nations in Africa is a
double-edged sword. Whereas aid from the U.S., World Bank, or International Monetary Fund is
usually attached to respect for human rights and transition to a democratic system of
government, China’s aid comes with no strings attached. Though Chinese companies are
awarded hefty contracts from African countries many are from nations that are blatantly corrupt
and have no respect for the human rights of its citizens. This gives China a mixed reputation in
Africa: China is a country willing to provide crucial aid to some of Africa’s poorest nations, but
also has no concern for the well being of the general population in nations that receive Chinese
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aid. Moreover, some of the aid China provides African nations is not developmental, but
military, and China has shown it will sell weapons to just about anyone, even the worst dictators
in Africa whose countries are under strict arms embargos.
For the Soviets Angola represented the height of their power during the Cold War, having
defeated the U.S. in Vietnam and Angola consecutively. The Angolan conflict also encouraged a
more active Soviet foreign policy in the Third World for years to come. Anatoly Dobrynin
remarked, “having suffered no major international complications because of its interference in
Angola, Moscow had no scruples about escalating its activities in other countries, first Ethiopia,
then Yemen, a number of African and Middle Eastern states, and, to crown it all Afghanistan.”115
Here, Dobrynin highlights an interesting trend: after the Soviet’s victory in Angola they became
all too willing to intervene in regional conflicts and conduct proxy wars against the U.S. in the
developing world. However, these aggressive new policies in the Third World would contribute
to the downfall of the Soviet Union.
While the dust in Angola settled the Soviets became embroiled in the Ogaden War between
Somalia and Ethiopia in 1977. The Soviets gave Ethiopia “more than $1 billion worth of military
equipment” and also sent one thousand military advisors to help the Ethiopian army defeat
Somalia.116 Though the Soviets backed the winning side, “For the people of the Horn of Africa
the war and the interventions of the late 1970s would beget apocalyptic consequences.”117 The
Ogaden War fundamentally destabilized Somalia and the Horn of Africa remains notoriously
unstable to this day, especially Somalia. Furthermore, lucrative military aid to its Third World
clients would eventually bankrupt the Soviets. Though the Soviets were able to win the Ogaden
War they would pay dearly for their aggressive new Third World policy in Afghanistan. In
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Afghanistan the Afghan mujahedeen, aided by the U.S. and China among others, bled the Soviet
military dry. Just when the Soviets began to gain the upper hand in the Cold War they
overreached in the Third World and the Soviet system came crashing down.
The dynamics and effects of the Angolan conflict make it one of the most important
subjects in Cold War history. The crisis was a litmus test for the new U.S.-Chinese relationship
and resulted in one of the largest shifts in the history of American foreign policy. From détente
with the Soviet Union to a more belligerent policy of aiding anyone, despite their human rights
record, who stood against the Soviets in the Third World. The Angolan Civil War illuminated
China’s rise as an international power and aid donor to developing countries around the world.
China also showed that despite rapprochement with the U.S. it would still conduct relations with
countries deemed Soviet puppets by the United States. Moreover, the rise of the Soviet Union’s
power and confidence after victories in Vietnam and Angola was short lived and their empire
came crashing down after the new confidence they gained in Africa led them into Afghanistan.
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